In a class of informed principal problems with common values often used in applications we de…ne a particular mechanism which we call the assured allocation. It is always undominated, i.e. e¢ cient among the di¤erent types of the principal. We show it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium allocation of the three-stage game studied in Maskin and Tirole (1992) that coincides with the Rothschild-StiglitzWilson allocation when the latter is undominated. Under familiar conditions on hazard rates we show that the assured allocation is a neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson (1983) .
Introduction
Informed principal problems are adverse selection problems where the principal, who proposes a contract to an agent, has private information. Important examples are given by …rms with private information about projects who seek …nance from competing lenders or by managers with private information who have bargaining power when dealing with shareholders. Informed principal problems are conceptually harder to understand than models where only the agent has private information because the contract proposed by the principal could potentially be a signal about the principal's knowledge.
The purpose of this paper is to draw connections between two major contributions on this subject, namely the work by Myerson (1983) and by Maskin and Tirole (1992) . Myerson characterizes a "neutral" optimum, which is constructed in such a way that no private information can be revealed by the proposal itself. His approach is in part cooperative. In a more restrictive setting Maskin and Tirole (1992) and Maskin and Tirole (1990) characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of a contract-proposal game where the agent does not have any private information.
We are primarily interested in the case of common values. We will work here with the framework of Maskin and Tirole (1992) , assuming, in addition, quasi-linear payo¤s and certain sorting conditions. We construct in an inductive fashion, resembling the construction of the RSW (Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson) allocation in Maskin and Tirole (1992) , Proposition 2, a unique mechanism which we call the assured allocation. The mechanism can be understood as a solution to a principle-agent problem where the outside option varies with the type, as in Jullien (2000) . In our case the outside options are, however, de…ned endogenously.
The assured mechanism is shown to weakly Pareto dominate for the di¤erent types of the principal the RSW allocation. In consequence, it is always a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of their contract-proposal game. When the RSW is undominated, i.e. e¢ cient among the di¤erent types of the principal, the assured mechanism is the RSW, otherwise it is one of many perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes.
When the RSW is undominated it is a strong solution in the sense of Myerson (1983) , and, hence, strong solution, neutral optima, the RSW allocation and the assured mechanism all coincide. We also show that the assured mechanism is undominated (in the terminology of Myerson) or interim e¢ cient (in the sense of Maskin and Tirole).
We do not know how the assured mechanism and neutral optima relate in the presence of bunching. If bunching occurs then our iterative approach may possibly be inappropriate to capture neutral optima, which are de…ned as solutions to limits of rather involved …xed point problems. However, under familiar conditions on hazard rates that rule out bunching or generally if there are only two types, we can show that the assured mechanism is indeed a neutral optimum. Whether there are other neutral optima when there are more than two types is an open question.
Assured mechanisms may not be robust as they rely on the principal knowing the prior beliefs of the agent about the principal's type. In this paper the emphasis is, following Myerson, on the e¢ ciency properties of the mechanisms studied. Obviously an understanding of the robustness properties of mechanisms and how this interacts with e¢ ciency is very important. However, it is out of the scope of the current work and must be left for future research. It is worth emphasizing that such a task may not be merely a direct application of the results recently derived in Bergemann and Morris (2005) , Bergemann and Morris (2008) and the literature they cite. The reason is that in our framework the designer herself has private information. Therefore, on the one hand, an o¤ered mechanism may have some informational content and, on the other hand, the type space of the agent will include her prior beliefs about the principal's payo¤ type, and the type space of the principal will include the prior beliefs of the principal about the agent's prior beliefs.
In the case of independent values (see Maskin and Tirole (1990) ) it is typically possible to …nd undominated mechanism which are also ex-post e¢ cient, at least when utilities are quasi-linear. For this case we refer to the recent work of Mylovanov and Troeger (2007) and the literature they cite. We know only of a few other applications of the neutral optimum (Myerson (1983) ) or the neutral bargaining solution (Myerson (1984) ). Both the discussion of the lemon problem in Myerson (1985) and the extended liability problem discussed in Balkenborg (2006) are common value problems. Both problems do not fall into our framework. Applications to bargaining problems with two-sided incomplete information are given in Myerson (1984) and Darrough and Stoughton (1989) .
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide in a representative example a simple geometric analysis of the RSW, the neutral optimum and the assured allocation for the case of two types. In Section 3 we describe the general model and the weakest assumptions for which we know our analysis to hold. Section 4 discusses a number of central concepts, including interim e¢ ciency, the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson allocation, the neutral optimum and the assured allocation. The …rst part of Section 4 is devoted to a detailed study of assured allocations, in particular their uniqueness. In the second part we state our main results. Section 5 provides the proof that the assured allocation is a neutral optimum under no-bunching conditions. Section 6 concludes.
An illustration for the two-types case
We will be focusing on a model of bilateral trade between a producer and a buyer, when the producer's cost-e¢ ciency is her private information. While being seemingly very special, this model is representative of a wide range of models used in the literature to investigate the problems of monopoly regulation (see Baron and Myerson (1982) ) and nonlinear pricing (see Maskin and Riley (1984) ), and study …nancial contracts (see, for instance, Freixas and La¤ont (1990) ) and quality and price discrimination (see, for instance, Mussa and Rosen (1978) ). Maskin and Tirole (1992) also give many examples of informed principal problems. The modeling used here …ts for their case of managerial compensation. It is, in principle, the model used in the textbook La¤ont and Martimort (2002) , except that we also consider the case of common values. The de…ning characteristics of the framework that encompasses our and the aforementioned models will be outlined shortly.
For concreteness, let us consider here the example of an uninformed …rm owner and an informed manager. For this section only, we assume speci…c revenue and cost functions to …x ideas. However, the analysis remains valid for arbitrary revenue and cost functions satisfying the assumptions in Section 3.
The owner and the manager are assumed to be risk neutral. The manager produces an output q 0 which yields to the owner a revenue S (q; ) =where 0 and > 0 are scalars. The production cost, incurred by the manager, is
Thus, denotes the cost-e¢ ciency of the manager, which is private information to him. = 0 captures the case of private values, while > 0 captures the case of common values. In the latter case, cost-e¢ ciency is positively related with the owner's valuation.
Assume that there are only two types 2 f 1 ; 2 g with 2 > 1 ; and let s i = Pr( = i ) be the prior probability of type i . s 1 (and hence s 2 = 1 s 1 ) is assumed to be common knowledge. We denote the surplus from producing q when the cost-type is i (i 2 f1; 2g) by
Let the …rst-best production level for type = i be
The owner and the manager have to agree on a compensation t 0 and a production level q. Because of the concavity assumptions we are making we can ignore randomization in the contract. It su¢ ces hence to consider only option contracts where the owner and the manager agree on a pair of options ((t 1 ; q 1 ) ; (t 2 ; q 2 )). Hereby t i denotes the compensation to the manager for producing output q i ; i = 1; 2: Once the contract is agreed, the manager can select any of the two options: either the option (t 1 ; q 1 ) designed for type 1 or the option (t 2 ; q 2 ) designed for type 2. We assume that the owner cannot renege on the contract after he has observed which option the manager takes. Under such a contract, if both types select the option designed for them, then the payo¤ of the owner upon facing a manager of type i will be i = S(q i ; i ) t i ; and the payo¤ of the manager of type i will be
We will assume that the owner and all types of the manager have the same outside option, which is normalized to zero. 1 Let nowŝ i be the posterior probability of type i as it is perceived by the owner given the observed behavior of the manager during the negotiation of the contract. To be (interim) individually rational (given posterior beliefs about the manager's type), the agreed contract must satisfy the participation constraints U 1 0; U 2 0 and
That is, the manager and the owner prefer to reach an agreement rather than take up their outside option, given the posterior beliefs.
The Revelation Principle allows us to restrict attention to incentive-compatible contracts. De…ne U j i = t j C (q j ; i )
1 We assume that all types of the manager have the same outside option. Therefore, our model cannot be used to investigate the problem of a monopolist insurer (see Stiglitz (1977) ) or of franchising (see Maskin and Tirole (1992) ). We also assume that the owner is a monopolist and hence our model cannot be used to investigate the problem of a competitive insurance market (see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) ).
for all i; j 2 f1; 2g. Then incentive-compatibility requires
to hold for any i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j. Equivalently, since U i i = U i ; this can be expressed as
where
is the cost-gain from being of e¢ ciency-type 2 and not of 1 : The …rst condition simply says that the high-cost type prefers the option (t 1 ; q 1 ) -which ensures a payo¤ U 1 -over the option (t 2 ; q 2 ) -which ensures a payo¤ U 2 1 (q 2 ): Similarly, the second condition is the low-cost type's incentive-compatibility constraint. We call an option contract feasible relative to beliefsŝ if it is individually rational given beliefsŝ and incentive compatible. When beliefs coincide with priors, i.e.ŝ = s; then we will be referring to such contracts simply as feasible contracts.
For later use, let us de…ne here the owner's ex post individual-rationality constraints as
For the analysis it is convenient to work with a "reduced" form of the model where the transfers t i are eliminated. We rede…ne an option contract as
with the implicit understanding that in equilibrium each type selects the contract designed for himself and obtains the transfer t i = U i + C (q i ; i ). At this stage, we can highlight why our model is representative of the models we mentioned above. First, in all these models, the surplus and the …rst-best production levels are both either increasing or decreasing in the type of the informed party. In our case, we have W 2 (q) > W 1 (q) for q > 0 and q o 2 > q o 1 : Second, if the option contract dictates …rst-best production for each type and that all types break even, then the informed party does not have an incentive to mimic a type with higher …rst-best surplus, while she does have an incentive to mimic a type with lower …rst-best surplus. That is, in terms of our model here, when
Note that this is true in our model.
In this paper we analyze the case where one party, namely the manager, has full bargaining power, and hence o¤ers to the other party an option contract m in a take-orleave-it manner. It will be instructive, however, to compare this case with the standard case where the principal is the uninformed party.
We are hence comparing two versions of the following 3-stage game (see Maskin and Tirole (1992) ). After nature has determined the type of the manager, the principal (the party with the full bargaining power) proposes an option contract. Then the agent (the party without bargaining power) can accept or reject the contract. If it is rejected, the parties get their outside options. Otherwise the manager chooses an option. In Version 1, the standard principal-agent model with hidden information (see, for instance, La¤ont and Martimort (2002) Chapter 2), the principal is the uninformed owner and henceŝ i = s i , i = 1; 2. In Version 2 the principal is the informed manager.
For Version 1, it is well-known that the owner-optimal, full-information contract
is not incentive-compatible. The reason is, as we have seen above, that the manager prefers to choose the option (0; q o 1 ) regardless of her cost-type: in this way, the low-cost manager will attain information rents U 1 2 = 1 (q o 1 ). For any given ; the feasible mechanism which maximizes the pro…t of the owner, ( m 1 ; m 2 ), leaves the high-cost manager with zero pro…ts, i.e. U 1 = 0; and gives the low-cost manager an informational rent which leaves him indi¤erent between the two options, i.e. U 2 = 1 ( q 1 ) : Furthermore, the low-cost manager produces the …rst-best level, q 2 = q o 2 ; while the high-cost manager underproduces, i.e. q 1 < q o 1 : The high-cost manager's output balances the trade-o¤, in terms of the owner's expected (given prior beliefs) payo¤, between lower information rents for the low-cost manager and higher output distortion.
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The analysis changes dramatically in Version 2 when the informed party becomes the principal. Start with the case of private values, = 0, where S (q; ) does not depend on : In this case, the manager-optimal, full-information contract
is always incentive-compatible. E¤ectively the contract allows each type to choose the output he or she wants to produce and to keep all the proceeds. Note that under this contract the owner breaks even regardless of the type he faces. This is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in the three-stage game where the manager is the proposer (see Maskin and Tirole (1990) , Maskin and Tirole (1992) ). The contract is illustrated in the …gure below.
Consider next the case of common values, > 0, which is the focus of our work. Still, as long as
2 ) holds, the manager does not have an incentive to pretend that she is of a di¤erent type.
3 m M remains the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome.
We consider now the case
2 ) that arises for su¢ ciently high and su¢ ciently low ratio of cost-types : In this case, the manager-optimal, …rst-best contract is no longer incentive compatible. Now, there are two di¤erent subcases, depending on the prior probabilities s i , i = 1; 2. To discuss this case, we need a number 2 Formally, q 1 = arg max 6 of additional concepts (see Myerson (1983) and Maskin and Tirole (1992) ). In the private value case, S (q; ) is independent of ( = 0). The manager-optimal, …rst-best contract is incentive compatible, as is indicated by the linear indi¤erence curves I 1 and I 2 for the two types. (Each type would prefer contracts above his indi¤erence curve.)
A feasible contract is undominated if it is not dominated in the Pareto sense, from the point of view of the two types of the manager, by another feasible contract. A mechanism is safe if it is incentive compatible for the manager and ex post individually rational for the owner. Note that a safe mechanism is also feasible. A mechanism is a strong solution if it is safe and undominated. For instance, the manager-optimal, full-information contract is a strong solution if and only if it is incentive compatible. A mechanism is an RSW (Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson) allocation (relative to the outside options) if it maximizes for each type of the manager his utility subject to the incentive-compatibility constraints of all types and subject to the ex post participation constraints of the owner. Note that the RSW allocation is a strong solution if and only if it is undominated. 4 In our set-up here we have directly that the RSW allocation is given by the full information contract m M if the latter is incentive-compatible. So, if the manager-optimal, full-information contract is incentive-compatible, then this contract coincides with the RSW allocation. Therefore, the latter is also a strong solution.
However, if m M is not incentive-compatible, then the RSW allocation m RSW is given by m
(see Maskin and Tirole (1992) , Proposition 2). That is, the high-cost manager attains her best full-information option, while the low-cost manager's option is such that the high-cost type is indi¤erent between the two options and the owner makes zero pro…ts from each and every type. Note that at the option m The RSW is an important allocation. Maskin and Tirole (1992) Theorem 1 show, for our set-up, that a feasible mechanism is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) outcome if and only if it gives each type of the manager at least his payo¤ in the RSW allocation.
Therefore, if the RSW allocation is undominated, then it is the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium allocation. However, the RSW allocation can be dominated. In this case, then, there is multiplicity of PBE.
We show that a neutral optimum, as de…ned by Myerson (1983) , is a feasible mechanism that weakly dominates the RSW allocation, and hence it is always a PBE. By de…nition, the neutral optimum is undominated.
To …nd the neutral optimum we must …rst determine the set of all undominated feasible allocations. For each of these allocations Myerson (1983) de…nes so-called "warranted claim" vectors that are essential in the calculation of the neutral optimum. These are determined simultaneously with the undominated mechanisms.
We can …nd the undominated option contracts by maximizing for given weights 1 ; 2 0; 1 + 2 > 0; the weighted sum of utilities
subject to the incentive constraints for the two types of the manager and the participation constraint for the owner. Without loss of generality we can assume 1 + 2 = 1.
The Lagrangian for this problem is, with the appropriate Lagrange multipliers 12 , 21 and ;
where, for fi; jg = f1; 2g, j 6 = i;
are the so-called virtual surpluses for the two types. The relevance of the virtual surpluses becomes clear if we write them explicitly, using the de…nitions for U j i ; i; j = 1; 2; and that
Thus V S 1 depends only on U 1 and q 1 , and V S 2 only on U 2 and q 2 . Maximizing the Lagrangian is (for given Lagrange multipliers!) the same as maximizing each virtual surplus separately. The …rst-order conditions for an optimum are hence
As usual, the complementarity conditions must hold and the Lagrangian multipliers must be non-negative. Summing the …rst-order conditions (4) and (5) gives, since 1 + 2 = 1, that = 1. This implies, by the complementarity conditions, that the participation constraint of the owner must be binding.
Before continuing with the more detailed description of the optimal solution we note that Myerson (1983) associates with each pair of strictly positive utility weights ( 1 ; 2 ) a vector of warranted claims (! 1 ; ! 2 ) de…ned by
where V S i (i = 1; 2) is the virtual surplus, and 12 , 21 are the Lagrange multipliers, in the optimal solution. Clearly, this simultaneous system of equations has a unique solution.
We discuss the interpretation of the warranted claims further below. At the moment our aim is to determine them simultaneously with the optimal solution for the given weights. Notice that
where L is the value of the Lagrangian at the optimum and hence, by the complementarity conditions, equal to the value of the objective function at the optimum, 1 U 1 + 2 U 2 . The following Figure 3 illustrates the Pareto frontier, i.e. the utility allocations in undominated mechanisms, for the two types of manager. Several tangents corresponding to di¤erent utility weights are drawn. The two dotted lines intersect in the manager-optimal, …rst-best allocation, which is not feasible in the example shown. The intersections of the tangents with the two dotted hal ‡ines is here the set H of warranted claim vectors. The warranted claim allocations for a particular Pareto frontier.
While the participation constraint of the owner is always binding in an undominated mechanism, we must distinguish three cases for the incentive constraints of the two types.
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To discuss these cases denote with q i the output of type i at optimum. The following 5 There are four cases a priori concerning which incentive constraint is binding or not. Note that the incentive constraints can be written as
Suppose that both incentive constraints were binding, so (q 1 ) = U 2 U 1 = (q 2 ) and hence q 1 = q 2 = q (the option contract is a pooling contract). This is seen to lead immediately to a contradiction with the …rst-order conditions (6) and (7) given that arg max The extended Pareto frontier given a prior. (6) and (7) imply that both types produce at their …rst-best levels,
The pair of optimal utilities (U 1 ; U 2 ) is on the line segment with slope s 1 =s 2 given by the binding participation constraint
and the incentive constraints, which can be written as,
One checks immediately that this is a proper line segment of positive, …nite length. It is the line segment BC in Figure 4 . Since 12 = 21 = 0 the virtual surpluses and hence the warranted claims are just the …rst-best surpluses of the two types,
. This case includes the one we already studied above, where the manager-optimal, full-information is incentivecompatible and, hence, coincides with the RSW allocation.
CASE 2. Only the incentive constraint U s 2 . Thus, this case is relevant when a relatively high utility weight is given on the high-cost type. By (7) the low type's e¤ort level is at its …rst-best: q 2 = q o 2 . By (6), and given that 1 (q) is increasing, the high type's output level is weakly lower than the …rst-best: q 1 = arg max q 0 fs 1 W 1 (q) 21 1 (q)g: Given 21 = s 2 2 ; we can …nd the various optima for various utility weights 0 2 s 2 by gradually increasing 21 from 21 = 0 until 21 = s 2 . Point C in Figure 4 corresponds to the utility allocation at the optimal solution with 21 = 0, where the low-cost type still produces …rst-best. By increasing 21 (decreasing 2 ), high-cost output falls below the …rst-best level. Since the incentive constraint
and the participation constraint are binding and since 1 (q) is increasing, as we increase
). This yields segment CD in the Pareto frontier in Figure 4 . However, precisely from 21 = s 2 onwards U 1 is decreasing. Any further decrease in type 2's utility U 2 is necessarily associated with a reduction in U 1 . We now have a negative utility weight on the low type and are in the backward bending range below point D of what we call the extended Pareto frontier in Figure 4 . These contracts are, of course, dominated. Interestingly, note that if 21 = s 2 ; then q 1 = q 1 :
Associated with an undominated option contract in range CD is the following warranted claims vector. Since 12 = 0 and 2 + 21 = s 2 we obtain ! 2 = V S 2 = W 2 (q 0 2 ). A simple geometric argument using (10) shows that
is on the horizontal half line in Figure 3 (and 5). s 2 . Now, a relatively high weight is given on the low-cost type. By (6) the low type's e¤ort level is at its …rst-best: q 1 = q o 1 . By (7), and given that 1 (q) is increasing, the high type's output level is weakly higher than the …rst-best: q 2 = arg max q 0 fs 2 W 2 (q)+ 12 1 (q)g: Given 12 = s 1 1 ; we can …nd the various optima for various utility weights by gradually increasing 12 from 12 = 0 until 12 = s 1 . Point B in Figure 4 corresponds to the utility allocation at the optimal solution with 12 = 0, where the low-cost type still produces …rst-best. By increasing 12 (decreasing 1 ), lowcost output increases beyond the …rst-best level. Alongside the owner's participation constraint, the incentive constraint
is binding. This implies that as we increase 12 we necessarily decrease U 1 (since
and q 2 is increasing in 12 ). Initially, insofar 12 s 1 ; as we increase 12 we increase U 2 (since U 2 = s 1 W 1 (q o 1 ) + s 2 W 2 (q 2 ) + s 1 1 (q 2 )): This yields segment AB in the Pareto frontier in Figure 4 . From 12 = s 1 onwards the utility weight on the low type is negative and U 2 is decreasing. We are in the backward bending range to the left of Point A of the extended Pareto frontier in Figure 4 . The corresponding contracts are dominated.
Associated with an undominated option contract in range AB is the following warranted claims vector. Since 21 = 0 and 1 + 12 = s 1 we obtain Figure 3 (and 5). Figure 5 shows how the extended Pareto frontier varies as we vary the probability on the low cost type from s 1 = 1=6 to s 1 = 2=3. The latter prior corresponds to the steeper curve. Because the RSW allocation does not depend on this distribution it is the intersection of these curves. For s 1 = 1=6 the point N is a neutral optimum, as will be discussed shortly. Two extended Pareto frontiers corresponding to di¤erent priors. The RSW intersects both frontiers. The neutral optimum coincides with the RSW for the steeper curve, but is di¤erent (point N) for the other.
We are now ready to discuss the neutral optimum. Let P be the Pareto frontier for the two types of the manager, i.e. the set of utility pairs (U 1 ; U 2 ) in undominated option contracts. De…ne for i = 1; 2
As we have seen, the set H of all warranted claims allocations is located on the union of the two line half lines
Let H be the closure of H. Myerson (1983) characterizes a neutral optimum as an undominated mechanism that dominates a utility allocation in H, i.e. that dominates a limit of a sequence of warranted claims. Notice that the RSW allocation is on the half-line H 1 . It is either on segment CA of the Pareto frontier or on the backward-bending part of the extended frontier. Correspondingly, there are two cases: a) H 1 intersects the Pareto-frontier P; as for the frontier P 1 in Figure 5 . The point of intersection is necessarily the RSW allocation, which, hence, coincides with the neutral optimum.
b) H 1 intersects the extended Pareto-frontier in the downward-bending part to the left of Point A in Figure 4 . In this case the RSW allocation is also on the backward-bending part of the extended Pareto frontier. Here, the neutral optimum is the option contract that gives the low-cost type the highest payo¤, U max 2 . In Figure 5 point N gives the neutral optimum for frontier P 2 .
Before summarizing our results we motivate brie ‡y the notion of warranted claims in Myerson (1983) : Start with strictly positive utility weights 1 and 2 and the associated optimal contract ((U 1 ; q 1 ) ; (U 2 ; q 2 )). Let us jump out of the model and consider for the same players and types in the abstract a mechanism that is also optimal with respect to the same utility weights for the same Lagrange multipliers. Whatever the more general model is exactly, such a mechanism must de…ne the numbers
where v j i is the expected utility to type i if he "mimics" type j and i is the expected payo¤ of the owner conditional on facing type i. If the mechanism is optimal with respect to the same Lagrange multipliers, then, by the complementarity conditions and > 0; we have s 1 1 + s 2 2 = 0 which means that the participation constraint of the owner is binding. Moreover, ij v i i = ij v j i ; i 6 = j; i; j = 1; 2. The virtual surpluses associated with the abstract contract would be
We now ask: what would the utilities (v
2 ) have to be in an abstract mechanism like the one above to yield the same virtual surpluses as the original optimal mechanism ((U 1 ; q 1 ) ; (U 2 ; q 2 )) and be a strong solution? Since 1 = 2 = 0 in a strong solution, (v 1 1 ; v 2 2 ) has to satisfy the system of equations
The unique solution to this system is called a vector of warranted claims by Myerson (1983) . In that work, he makes it precise in which sense the warranted claims vector de…nes a strong solution in an arti…cial, extended model where there are more mechanism available than in the original model. His axiomatic characterization describes the neutral optimum as a mechanism that dominates the limit of a sequence of payo¤ vectors in strong solutions of extended models. His main characterization result describes this condition in terms of the warranted claim vectors only.
De…ne for the two-type case the assured allocation as the mechanism which maximizes among all feasible option contracts the expected payo¤ of low-cost type subject to highcost type getting at least his …rst-best surplus W 1 (q 0 1 ) : This de…nition will be extended for an arbitrary number of types in Section 4. We can now summarize our analysis as follows.
Proposition 1
The neutral optimum is the assured allocation..
Corollary 1
If the RSW allocation is undominated, it is a strong solution and coincides with the neutral optimum. Otherwise a neutral optimum dominates the RSW.
We now turn to the case of at least two types and general value and cost functions. With more than two types the possibility of bunching arises, in which case we do not know how neutral optima look like for our environment. Moreover, in the more general set-up, we do not know whether neutral allocations are unique.
The Model
A manager (the principal) produces q units of a product at the total cost C (q; ) which depends on his "type"described by the scalar belonging to some interval . Costs and marginal costs are non-decreasing in q, i.e.
for all and q 0. Total and marginal costs are decreasing in , i.e. @C @ (q; ) < 0; if q > 0; and @ 2 C @q@ (q; ) < 0 holds for all . The latter is a sorting condition that ranks types according to their marginal utility from trade. It states that higher types value trading with the agent more.
We restrict attention to the case of …nitely many types 1 < 2 < < N taken from . We denote the probability of type i , 1 i N , by s i . Let f i P i j=1 s j ; with the convention that f 0 = 0: The type of the manager is his private knowledge, and the distribution of types is common knowledge.
The value of the product to the owner (the agent) is S (q; ). The value of the product is non-decreasing and the marginal value non-increasing in the level of output:
for all and q 0. In the case of independent values S (q; ) is independent of . We are here primarily interested in the case of common values and assume that the value of the product is non-decreasing in and its marginal value not decreasing too fast in and too slow in q: Moreover, we assume that the value of the product is not decreasing too slow in q :
for all and q 0. We also assume that there are gains from trade and …xed costs are not too high:
These conditions imply that the participation constraints for the various types of the principal are never binding in the RSW allocation and the assured allocation discussed below because high types will not want to mimic lower types and the lowest type will get at least the …rst best surplus. We can therefore ignore them in the following.
Remark 1 We could drop the assumption that is an interval and assume that S (q; ) and C (q; ) are de…ned for = 1 ; ; N only. We would just need to express the monotonicity conditions without partially di¤erentiating with respect to .
Remark 2 The model satis…es the Sorting Assumption on page 5 of Maskin and Tirole (1992) , except that we restrict q to be nonnegative. However, even with this restriction, Propositions 2, 3, 4(a) and 5 of Maskin and Tirole (1992) still hold. Thus, the hypothesis of their Theorem 1 is satis…ed (see their Remark 3 after their Theorem 1). Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 of Maskin and Tirole (1992) will be used here to yield Propositions 2 and 3 below.
Throughout we will use the notations for the surplus generated from trade between the agent and a principal of type i and the cost di¤erence, respectively, We assume that it is also concave.
A1 : 00 i (q) 0 for all 1 i < N and q 0. We need A1 in order to guarantee that the problem X n (y) discussed below is convex for every n and y 0, and hence has a convex solution set which is described by the Lagrangian.
We also assume that A2 : i (q) + W i (q) has a unique maximizer for all scalars 0 and all 1 i < N . Given A2; we obtain that
Remark 3 Notice that q i (f i 1 ) = q o i : Notice also that q i ( ) is strictly decreasing in whenever q i ( ) > 0:
We will also use for Theorem 2 the following assumption: A3: q i ( ) is a strictly increasing function of i for all 2 [0;
This condition prevents bunching in certain important mechanisms that will be de…ned later. A su¢ cient condition for A3 is that
Remark 4 These conditions are very similar to those in Jullien (2000) .
Remark 5 To understand the above conditions on the probability distribution function, note that these are su¢ cient for 6 f i 1 s i to be strictly increasing in i for any 2 [0;
The latter condition in conjunction with the above condition on
and the concavity properties of W i (q) and i 1 (q) ensure 7 in turn A3.
The principal and the agent are involved in the following three-stage game 3 : First the principal o¤ers a contract/mechanism to the agent in a take-or-leave-it manner. A mechanism is a set of announcements for the principal, M p ; and a set of announcements for the agent M a and an allocation-rule that maps announcements to (possibly lotteries over) transfer-output pairs. The agent then accepts or rejects the o¤ered contract. If the agent accepts the contract then the contract is executed: the players choose their announcements and the associated allocation is implemented. We assume that the principal's and agent's reservation payo¤s are zero.
Following Maskin and Tirole (1992) we focus on …nite simultaneous-actions mechanisms. By the revelation principle for Bayesian games, we have that for any mechanism o¤ered by the principal and for given beliefs after the contract has been accepted, any equilibrium of the mechanism corresponds to a truthful equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism (DRM). In such a mechanism, the principal simply announces her type, and given an announcement i an allocation i is implemented. This allocation is the same with the one from the general mechanism. We therefore focus on DRMs.
Given our convexity assumptions we also focus on deterministic mechanisms. A deterministic DRM is then an option contract: 8 transfer from the owner to the manager of type i : For expositional simplicity, let us refer, hereafter, with some abuse of terminology, to a deterministic DRM as, simply, a mechanism/contract. Under such a contract, denote the payo¤ of the agent upon facing a principal of type i by 
This is a direct consequence of the fact that q i ( ) is given by
8 Though we allow for net transfers to be negative in the optimal allocations all transfers will be positive. and the payo¤ of the principal of type i by
The agent's participation constraint is
where (ŝ i ) 1 i N are the posterior beliefs of the agent after the principal has o¤ered an option contract : O¤ered a mechanism , the agent will accept it if and only if the participation constraint is satis…ed by the o¤ered contract. We will refer to a mechanism that satis…es the participation constraint as an individually-rational mechanism. An ex post individually-rational mechanism is a contract that satis…es:
Moreover, a mechanism satis…es truth-telling if the following incentive-compatibility constraints hold:
We will refer to a mechanism that satis…es truth-telling as an incentive-compatible mechanism. Notice that, after eliminating t i from the agent's payo¤ upon facing a principal of type i ; we have that i = W i (q i ) U i : After using the de…nition of U i ; the incentivecompatibility and participation constraints can be re-written, respectively, as
We have:
Lemma 1 For a mechanism to be incentive-compatible, it is necessary and su¢ cient that
9 To see how these incentive-compatibility constraints arise note that t i C(q i ; i ) t j C(q j ; i ) is re-written as U i U j + C(q j ; j ) C(q j ; i ): Notce then that for j > i we have C(q j ; j ) C(q j ; i ) = C(q j ; j ) C(q j ; j 1 ) + C(q j ; j 1 )
Proof. It follows by usual arguments. Speci…cally, the necessary part is a direct consequence of the de…nition of incentive-compatible mechanisms, the properties of i (q) and that the local incentive-compatibility constraints for types i and i + 1 imply
The su¢ ciency part follows from: (a) after forward iteration of U i U i+1 i (q i+1 ) we have U i U j P j 1 v=i v (q v+1 ); with j > i; which, given 0 v > 0 and, from q i q i+1 for any 1 i < N; that q v+1 q j for i v < j 1; implies
; with j < i; which, given 0 v > 0 and, from q i q i+1 for any 1 i < N; that q v q j for j < v i;
From now on we will, unless stated otherwise, use the substitution U i = t i C (q i ; i ) and describe a contract as an N -tuple ((U i ; q i )) 1 i N (m i ) 1 i N m.
De…nitions and Concepts

Strong, undominated, interim e¢ cient
In Myerson's framework all constraints are rewritten as incentive constraints. Moreover, in his model there can be several agents, who can have their own private information. See page 1772 of Myerson (1983) for how to interpret the given model in his framework. Adjusting his de…nitions to the way we set up the model here, we have:
De…nition 1 A mechanism is feasible if it is incentive-compatible and individually-rational relative to prior beliefs (i.e. ifŝ i = s i for all 1 i N ).
De…nition 2 A mechanism is interim e¢ cient if it is feasible and there does not exist another feasible mechanism which gives every type of every player at least the same utility and some types a strictly higher utility.
De…nition 3 A mechanism is undominated if it is feasible and there does not exist another feasible mechanism which gives every type of the principal at least the same utility and some of his types a strictly higher utility.
Remark 6 An undominated mechanism is called an interim e¢ cient allocation in Maskin and Tirole (1992) . For the purpose of this paper it will be more convenient to work with Myerson's terminology throughout.
De…nition 4 A mechanism is safe if it is incentive-compatible and ex post individually rational.
Remark 7 A safe mechanism is feasible because ex-post implies (interim) individual rationality.
Remark 8 Myerson's de…nition is more general because it also applies to models with several agents who can have their own private information. He requires that the mechanism would have to remain feasible even if the type of the principal would become common knowledge.
De…nition 5 A mechanism is a strong solution if it is safe and undominated.
Remark 9
The assured allocation, we de…ne shortly, is an undominated mechanism which, under certain conditions, is not safe.
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria and the RSW allocation
We will restrict attention to perfect Bayesian equilibria (for a formal de…nition, see page 8 of Maskin and Tirole (1992) ) of the three-stage game 3 .
De…nition 6 A mechanism ((U i ; q i )) 1 i N is an RSW (Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson) allocation if it maximizes for each type of the principal his utility subject to the incentive constraints of all types and subject to the ex post participation constraints of the agent.
Given our assumptions (recall our Remark 2) we can apply Proposition 2 in Maskin and Tirole (1992) to yield:
is the solution to Programs (RSW n ) de…ned inductively for n = 1;
; N as follows:
The following proposition is an application of Theorem 1 in Maskin and Tirole (1992) to our setting (recall our Remark 2).
Proposition 3 A feasible mechanism ((U i ; q i )) 1 i N is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium allocation of the three-stage game 3 if and only if it gives each type of the principal at least his utility in the RSW allocation. In particular, if the RSW allocation is undominated, then it is the only Perfect Bayesian equilibrium allocation.
From the above Proposition, it follows directly that
Corollary 2 The following statements are equivalent:
1. The RSW allocation is undominated.
2. The RSW allocation is a strong solution.
3. The 3-stage game has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium allocation, namely the RSW allocation.
However, if the RSW allocation is dominated, then, following from the above Proposition, an equilibrium selection problem arises. In this paper, we characterize one PBE allocation that dominates the RSW allocation. This allocation is undominated, and, in particular, a neutral allocation as introduced by Myerson (1983) .
The Assured Allocation
This work introduces the assured allocation, which is de…ned in an inductive manner.
We consider a sequence of inductively de…ned optimization problems. Let 1 n N . Suppose the numbers V 1 ; ; V n 1 have been de…ned and let y 0. We de…ne a mechanism (U n i (y) ; q n i (y)) 1 i n as the solution to, and the scalar V n (y) as the maximal value of, the following constrained optimization problem, referred to as X n (y):
Of particular importance is the case y = 0. We call (U n i (0) ; q n i (0)) 1 i n the n-assured allocation. For n = N we speak for short of the assured allocation. We call V n V n (0) the assured claim of type n and use it in the de…nition of problems X j (y), n + 1 j N . The assured utility levels V i are, as we will see, closely related to the warranted claims in Myerson (1983) . We hence call the constraints U i V i the warranted claim constraints.
One way to interpret the assured allocation is to think of the various types of the principal as players and that the total group of N players is formed gradually by starting with type/player i = 1 and adding each time a type/player i + 1: Type i + 1 is more productive than every lower type. Therefore, conditional on, …rst, all lower types receiving at least as much as they would if they were the most productive types in the group and, second, incentive-compatibility being maintained, type i + 1 extracts the maximum possible surplus from what he has generated. The di¤erence, in our setting, of the assured allocation from the RSW allocation is that in the latter it is the agent's ex post, instead of the interim, participation constraint(s) that must be satis…ed.
For further reference we introduce two related optimization problems de…ned for each 1 i n. First, let X n (y) be the more constrained optimization problem which is derived from X n (y) after adding the downward incentive constraints
for 1 i n 1:
The signi…cance of this problem comes from Lemma 1 which ensures that a solution to X n (y) is a feasible mechanism for the informed principal problem with n types and beliefs s n i = s i s 1 + +sn for 1 i n and s n i = 0 for n < i. 10 Secondly, letX n (y) be the less constrained problem which is derived from X n (y) after dropping all the monotonicity constraints MC i . In both the latter problems the numbers V i used in the warranted claim constraints are the maximal values U i i (0) from the problem X i (0). The Lagrangian for the problem X n (y) ; with the appropriate multipliers i ; i ; i and ; is (with n + n > 0)
Notice that ( n + n ) is a weight on the objective function in the Lagrangian and not, strictly speaking, a Lagrange multiplier. Normally one would set ( n + n ) = 1: However, if one multiplies in a solution to the …rst-order conditions for the Lagrangian problem all multipliers, including ( n + n ) ; by the same constant, the optimum is not changed. Rather than …xing ( n + n ) we can hence …x any positive Lagrange multiplier at a suitable value. For us it will be convenient to set = 1, once we have shown that must always be positive. This will ease the comparison between the solutions to the problems X n (y) and X k (0) for k < n below. Note thus that k and k are determined as Lagrange multipliers for the problem X n (y) while only their sum is determined in the problem X k (0) : Using 0 0 n 0 we can rewrite the Lagrangian as:
10 Note that (PC) can be rewritten as
The …rst-order conditions for i = 1;
; n are:
Hence > 0 and so the participation constraint of the agent must be binding
From now on we set = 1.
Hence the …rst-order conditions for i = 1; ; n become:
Let g i = P i j=1 j ; with g 0 0. The …rst-order conditions with respect to U i imply, using
We will denote a solution to optimization problem X n (y) by (U When there is no danger of confusion we will often drop the (y) or even the superscript n in the solution.
The neutral optimum
We use here Theorem 7 in Myerson (1983) to de…ne the neutral optima because our framework does not allow us to introduce his axiomatic characterization. The notion of a neutral optimum extends that of a strong solution.
Fix weights~ = ( 1 ; ; N ) with i > 0 and P N i=1 i = 1 for the di¤erent types of the principal. We can then obtain an undominated mechanism by maximizing the weighted utility
subject to the participation constraint (17) for the full model in Section 3 and subject to all incentive constraints IC i;j which can be rewritten as U i U j i;j (q j ) for all i; j; where i;j (q) = C (q; j ) C (q; i ).
11 Let be the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint and let i;j be the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive constraint IC i;j .
Myerson shows that on the hyperplane (
one can uniquely identity a point (! i ) 1 i N , called the warranted claim allocation, by the system of equations
are the virtual surpluses of each type, where U i ; q i ; ij ; 1 i; j n; and are evaluated at the optimal solution of the problem that determines the undominated allocations for given weights i ; 1 i n.
12 In case of a …xed point, (! i ) 1 i n = (U i ) 1 i n , the mechanism (U i ; q i ) 1 i n is a strong solution of the given model and hence, according to Myerson (1983) , a neutral optimum. However, to have hope for existence of a …xed point one must allow for some of the utility weights i to be zero. If some of the i are zero the above de…nition of warranted claims no longer guarantees a unique solution for the warranted claims. Myerson therefore proceeds by considering a sequence of strictly positive utility weights~ converging to~ . For each element in the sequence one can calculate the undominated mechanism (U i ; q i ) 1 i N 1 which maximizes the weighted utility with respect to these weights and the corresponding warranted claims
then (U i ; q i ) 1 i N is called a neutral mechanism, regardless of whether it is a strong solution or not.
Myerson shows that a "…xed point" de…ned in this way always exists in his model with …nite action spaces. He does this by combining the method to prove existence of a perfect equilibrium with duality theory and Kakutani's …xed point theorem. Whether neutral optima exist for our framework is unknown a priori. We avoid the problem by constructing explicit candidates and then show that they have the above properties.
Properties of assured allocations
In this Section we characterize some properties of the assured allocations. These properties will be crucial in proving our main results, Theorems 1 and 2, at the end of this Section.
Basic properties
Lemma 2 The participation constraint of the agent is binding in a solution to the problem X n (y). Moreover, for each type 1 i < n either the incentive constraint IC i and/or the warranted claim constraint WC i is binding.
Proof. Suppose the participation constraint was not binding in an optimum. By increasing all utilities in this contract slightly by the same amount for all types 1 i n, we would obtain another admissible contract for the problem X n (y) which would give strictly higher utility to type n than in the proposed optimum.
Suppose for some type 1 i n 1 both IC i and WC i are slack. Then one can obtain a new admissible contract by reducing type i's utility slightly and increasing the utility of all types i + 1;
; n such that the participation constraint is not violated and they all receive the same amount more. This contradicts the optimality of the presumed solution.
Lemma 3 Suppose type n produces q n n in a solution to X n (0). Then = (V n + n (q n n ) ; q n n ). We show now that this contract is admissible for the problem X n+1 (0) and hence V n+1 V n + n (q n n ) follows from the de…nition of V n+1 . To show admissibility notice …rst that the contract satis…es by construction all incentive constraints IC i , the monotonicity constraints MC i and the warranty constraints WC i .
The participation constraint for the agent is also satis…ed. To see the latter, we notice …rst that W n (q n n ) V n must hold. For n = 1 this is clear. For n > 1 we would otherwise obtain from the participation constraint for the problem X n (0) that
So ((U n i ; q n i )) 1 i n 1 would be admissible for the problem X n 1 (0), give utility at least V n 1 to type n 1; due to U n n 1 V n 1 by WC n 1 ; and have a slack participation constraint for the agent. However, this means that we have a solution for problem X n 1 (0) in which the participation constraint is slack. This contradicts Lemma 2.
We have furthermore that for any q
and therefore
The above Lemma implies, clearly, that assured claims are weakly increasing.
Lemma 4 Suppose that in a solution (U n i ; q n i ) 1 i n to X n (y) the k-warranted claim constraint holds with equality for 1 k < n. Then
and the restricted solution (U
. If in addition the warranted claim constraint is not binding at k + 1; then we must have q n k < q n k+1 , i.e. there cannot be bunching between types k and k + 1.
Then the restriction of the solution ((U n i ; q n i )) 1 i k would satisfy all constraints of the problem X k (0) with the participation constraint being slack. Since type k receives V k in this solution, (U n i ; q n i ) 1 i k is an optimal solution of X k (0) in which the participation constraint is slack. This contradicts Lemma 2.
Suppose next that
Since the participation constraint for X n (y) is binding in the optimal contract (U n i ; q n i ) 1 i n and since the participation constraint for X k (0) is binding in the optimal contract U k i ; q
By construction all warranted claim constraints and all incentive constraints IC i are satis…ed as well as the monotonicity constraints MC i for 1 i n possibly with the exception ofq n k+1 q n k , are satis…ed. However, also the latter inequality holds. To see this, note that, using IC k ; and WC k+1 if +1 < n orÛ n n = U n n V n if +1 = n; and Lemma 3,
which implies by the monotonicity of k thatq n k+1
is admissible for the problem X n (y) with a slack participation constraint. SinceÛ
it is also an optimal solution for this problem, again in contradiction to Lemma 2. Thus the equality (26) must hold. In consequence, (U n i ; q n i ) 1 i k is admissible for the problem X k (0) and since U n k = V k it is an optimal solution for this problem. Finally, suppose that the warranted claim constraint is not binding at k + 1, i.e. U n k+1 > V k+1 , and q
which contradicts the incentive constraint IC k .
Lemma 5 The solution (U n i ; q n i ) 1 i n to the optimization problem X n (y) is unique. Moreover, the corresponding mulitpliers for a given 'bunching pattern'. By the latter we mean that the set B of indices i for which q n i = q n i+1 holds is …xed. The binding incentive constraints IC i for k < i < n (recall Lemma 2) give
where U n n is by de…nition the same in all solutions of X n (y). Since ; ng into maximally connected sets J such that the monotonicity constraint is binding for any two adjacent indices i, i+1 in J. Thus a set J = fi 1 i i 2 g is in the partition if i 1 1; i 2 = 2 B and for all i 2 J it holds that (i 2 B , i + 1 2 J). We now claim that the left-hand term in the participation constraint (23) is, with the variables determined as just described, strictly increasing in g n k . To show this we prove that its derivative with respect to g n k is strictly positive almost everywhere. The term on the left-hand side in (23), which depends on g n k , is, using again Lemma 4,
Di¤erentiating and using the equations (24) and (25) yields (recall g
by the monotonicity properties of the i and W i . Thus the derivative is strictly positive except when g n k = f k , which proves our claim. Thus there can be at most one value of g n k for which the participation constraint is satis…ed. Thus there can only be one solution (including the Lagrange multipliers) for each bunching pattern.
Suppose next that we have two di¤erent solutions to the optimization problem X n (y) (excluding the Lagrange multipliers). Any convex combination of the two solutions is also a solution because the optimization problem is convex. Since there are in…nitely many convex combinations and only …nitely many bunching patterns, we can …nd two di¤erent solutions with the same bunching pattern, which contradicts the above …nding. This concludes the proof.
In particular, we have shown the following.
Remark 10 In the same fashion it can be shown that the optimization problemX n (y) has a unique solution.
Corollary 3 The assured allocation is unique.
Lemma 6 The solution ((U n i ; q n i )) 1 i n for problem X n (0) is also a solution to the complete problem X n (0), which must hence be unique.
Proof. For type 1 i < n we distinguish two cases: i) The incentive constraint IC i is binding
Then by the monotonicity constraint MC i we have
and hence (DC i ) is satis…ed. ii) If IC i is not binding, then by Lemma 2 WC i is binding. Then, by Lemma 3 and WC i+1 and the de…nition of V n we have
where we can set q Lemma 7 The n-assured allocation is undominated.
Proof. Suppose the n-assured allocation is dominated by an undominated mechanism. Then the undominated allocation is also a solution to X n (0) and hence identical to the n-assured allocation.
We are now ready to prove the following important result.
Proposition 4
The assured allocation weakly dominates the RSW allocation.
Proof. For n = 1; : : : ; N consider the following allocations. Let U RSW i ; q RSW i 1 i n be the RSW allocation for the restricted typeset f1; : : : ng. Let ((U n i ; q n i )) 1 i n be a solution to the problem X n (0). Let Û n i ;q n i 1 i n be the contract which satis…es
for any 1 i < n and where Û n n ;q n n solves the following optimization problem Z n : max
We prove by induction over n that a) U RSW n ; q RSW n is admissible for the problem Z n and hence satis…es U RSW n Û n n ; and b) Û n i ;q n i 1 i n is admissible for the problem X n (0) and hence satis…es thatÛ n n U n n = V n . Thus, U RSW n V n , which proves our proposition. For n = 1 all three solutions coincide and so our claims hold. Suppose that they hold for n 1 1. To prove claim a) for type n, notice that U
by our induction assumption. Hence U RSW n ; q RSW n is feasible for problem Z n ; due to U RSW n 1 U RSW n n 1 (q RSW n ). SinceÛ n n is the optimal value for problem Z n we have therefore U RSW n Û n n . We show next that claim b) holds for type n. We notice that all warranty constraints and all incentive constraints for Problem X n (0) hold (by construction of Û n n ;q n n and because
is a solution to X n 1 (0)). The ex-ante participation constraint from problem X n 1 (0) for Û n i ;q n i 1 i n 1 and the ex post participation constraint for Û n n ;q n n from Problem Z n imply that the participation constraint from the Problem X n (0) also holds for Û n i ;q n i 1 i n . As in the proof of Proposition 2 (Appendix A, top of page 38) in Maskin and Tirole (1992) , using that W n 1 q n 1 n 1
n 1 by Lemma 3, one can show for the problem Z n thatq n n 1 <q n n . This implies in particular that all monotonicity constraints of the problem X n (0) are satis…ed by this contract. Hence Û n i ;q n i 1 i n is admissible for X n (0). Since U n n = V n is the optimal value for problem X n (0) we have thereforeÛ n n U n n = V n . This completes the proof.
Corollary 4
The RSW allocation is undominated if and only if it is the assured allocation.
The previous properties will be used to prove Theorem 1. The next two will be used to prove Theorem 2. Proposition 5 Under Assumption A3 there is no bunching in a solution for the problem X n (y), y 0; i.e. q n 1 (y) < q n 2 (y) < < q n n (y) Thus a solution to the problemX n (y) is also a solution to the problem X n (y).
Proof. The proof of the …rst part is by induction on n. For n = 1 there is nothing to show. Suppose the claim holds for all 1 i < n. Let (U n i (y) ; q n i (y)) 1 i n be a solution of X n (y)
Suppose …rst that none of the warranted claim constraints WC i , 1 i < n, are binding. Then g n i (y) = P i j=1 i j (y) = 0 for all 1 i n 1. Therefore q n i (y) = q i (0) for all 1 i n; with q i ( ) as de…ned prior to Assumption A3. By Assumption A3 we have q 1 (0) < q 2 (0) < < q n (0) .
Hence (U n i (y) ; q n i (y)) 1 i n is the solution of the relaxed problemX n (y) where the monotonicity constraints of problem X n (y) are ignored.
Otherwise there exists a largest 1 k < n for which WC i is binding. By Lemma 4 (q n i (y)) 1 i k is part of a solution for problem X k (0) and hence forX k (0) because 
The main results
Theorem 1
The assured allocation is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the three stage game 3 .
We prove them now for l = n > 1 and y 0. By Lemma 8 the solution to X n (0) induces the solution X n 1 (y) with y determined by (y) = U n i (0) for all i < n; after using also claim (1) of the induction assumption and because we can choose the same Lagrange multipliers in both problems. This proves claim (1) for y = 0 and all i < l = n: We also have 
Since U n n (0) = V n by de…nition, and since U We obtain, after using the second part of claim (2) for y = 0 and i < n, overall that ! n n (0) = V n = U n n (0). This proves claims (1) and the …rst part of (2) for y = 0 and i = l = n:
Next, we construct a sequence such that the …rst-order conditions for the Lagrangian and the complementarity conditions always hold, where the ! high quality and high costs. For our analysis, it is important that higher types are unambiguously preferred by the agent. However, interesting applications, such as in the procurement of public services, might require purchaser who prefers a producer of lower cost-e¢ ciency and higher quality of produced services. Finally, the relationship to re…ne-ment concepts for signalling games remains to be studied. All these are very interesting future research projects.
